Prosecuting Heads of State of non-signatories to the Rome Statute: Jurisdictional Principles & Bars to Such Jurisdiction

Abstract

Heads of state can be accused of committing crimes against humanity but it is often difficult to hold them liable. This can be attributed to issues such as jurisdiction, immunity and the political will of the international community. I will focus specifically on how the jurisdictional principles concerning crimes against humanity apply and how these principles may prevent the prosecution of those liable for such crimes. In particular, I will consider how these principles operate in relation to a head of state that is charged with crimes against humanity, where the country is a non-signatory to the Rome Statute.

To exemplify this, the three acts committed by the President of Zimbabwe, President Robert Mugabe will be examined. First, discuss how his acts may fit the definition of crimes against humanity. Second, examine how the relevant sources of public international law apply to President Mugabe’s acts by considering who the sources apply to as well as taking territorial and temporal jurisdiction into account. Thereafter will consider bars to such jurisdiction including the effect of immunity. It will be concluded, by summarising how President Mugabe, as a current head of state of a non-signatory to the Rome Statute, can be prosecuted for crimes against humanity.